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EVIDENCE
I. OPINION EvIDENCE
A. Ewpert's Opinion
In Rowmialat v. Keller' the appellant's car was struck and
forced into the respondent's car causing severe injuries to the
respondent. The ability of the appellant to steer his car after
the first impact was an issue in the trial. The respondent sought
to have an expert automobile damage appraiser and repairman
show that his car was mechanically incapable of being steered
after the first impact. The lower court allowed the witness to
testify as to the total damage done, but refused to allow the
expert to give his opinion as to the damage caused by each
impact. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the de-
cision of the lower court on the basis of the general rule in this
state:
Opinion evidence is based on necessity and is not admis-
sible as a general rule when the facts can be reproduced
before the jury, in such a way as to show the condition
of things upon which the opinion of the witness was
based. It is a cardinal rule that the evidence must be
of such a character as not to fall within the range of
common experience and observation, and therefore not
to be intelligible to jurors without the aid of opinion.2
B. Laymenw's Opinion
In agreeing with the opinion espoused by Professor Wigmores
and earlier South Carolina cases,4 the supreme court in Living-
1. 167 S.E.2d 425 (S.C. 1969). In the lower court there were two de-
fendants, but only Keller appealed the $50,000 judgment for the plaintiff.
2. Jenkins v. E. L. Long Motor Lines, Inc., 233 S.C. 87, 95, 103 S.E.2d
523, 527 (1958). This was a car-truck collision case in which the defendant
sought to have an expert repairman show a trailer slid in a certain manner.
3. 7 J. WIGmORE, EViDENcE § 1918 (2d ed. 1940). Professor Wigmore
states that an opinion should be rejected only when it is superfluous in the
sense that it will be of no value to the jury.
4. E.g., in Lynch v. Pee Dee Express, Inc., 204 S.C. 537, 544, 30 S.E.2d
449, 452 (1944), the court stated:
Defendant further suggests that plaintiff and his driver were in no
position to judge the speed of the truck. It is true that their
opportunity for observation before the collision was limited. But
they saw the vehicles as they crashed and their subsequent move-
ments. We cannot say that this testimony as to the speed of the
truck is without probative value.
1
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ston v. Oakrmn rejected a contention that an estimate of speed
given by the defendant at the trial was of no probative value to
the jury and should have been disregarded. The estimate of
speed given in this case was based not only on the observation
of the vehicle before the collision but also upon the nature and
extent of the impact and the subsequent movement of the ve-
hicles. There was also other testimony bearing on the issue of
speed0 which served to further persuade the court that the coun-
terclaim and plea of contributory negligence put forth by the
defendant were matters which could not be decided by the court
as matters of law and should have been submitted to the jury
for their determination. Since the issues mentioned were not
submitted to the jury, the case was reversed and remanded for a
new trial.
0. "Most Probably" Rule
Testimony concerning medical cause-in-fact must meet a
special standard of admissibility.
[WI]hen the testimony of medical experts is relied
upon to establish causal connection between an accident
and subsequent disability or death, in order to establish
such, the opinion of experts must be at least that the
disability or death "most probably" resulted from the
accidental injury.
7
But even when testimony does not satisfy this requirement, the
so-called "most probably" rule, it is nevertheless admissible if
it is not solely relied on to establish the causal connection.
8
In Gambrell v. BurkesonO the plaintiff tried to establish a
causal connection between an automobile accident and an alleged
aggravation or acceleration of a cancer which the decedent had.
The supreme court felt Gambrell did not fit into the exception
to the "most probably" rule and thus reversed the lower court
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The court based its reversal
5. 164 S.E.2d 758 (S.C. 1968).
6. Testimony as to the impact and damage to the automobiles, the sub-
sequent movement of the automobiles, and a statement by the plaintiff that he
was on a "hurry up call" at the time of the accident was also introduced.
7. Cross v. Concrete Materials, 236 S.C. 440, 442, 114 S.E.2d 828, 829
(1960).
8. Grice v. Dickerson, Inc., 241 S.C. 225, 230, 127 S.E.2d 722, 725 (1962).
9. 165 S.E.2d 622 (S.C. 1969). This action was brought under the sur-
vival act and sought damages for pain, medical expenses, etc. which were sus-
tained by the deceased in an automobile accident with the defendant.
Vol. 21
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on the fact that there was no other evidence which would
directly and probably connect the accident with the cancer and
make proof of it legally sufficient. The court reasoned that the
jury could do no more than surmise and conjecture on the basis
of the evidence presented.
Perhaps Gamzbrell should be noted most for the distinction
which the court draws between it and Grice v. Dickerson, Inc.,
0
which sets forth the exception to the "most probably" rule.
Both Gambrell and riee were automobile accident cases. Al-
most immediately after the accident in Grice, the decedent com-
plained about injuries which later proved to be symptoms of
the illness. There was no evidence of a pre-existing condition
of this nature. Even though the medical experts could not
testify conclusively that the condition was caused by the acci-
dent, the surrounding circumstances were sufficient to allow
the evidence to be admitted even though it did not meet the
"most probably" rule requirements. In contrast to Grce, the
deceased in Gambrell allegedly suffered from the malady at
the time of the accident. Plaintiff's witness testified that if
the cancer was in existence at the date of the accident it would
have been unlikely for the deceased to have lived another year.
Since the death of the decedent did in fact occur between ten
and eleven months after the accident, it would be difficult to
say that the death was hastened by any injuries received in the
accident. Thus the plaintiff in GambreZl failed to show how
the accident had accelerated the cancer, and there were no other
circumstances to fit this case into the exception laid down by
the court in Gree.
ILI CIC MSTANTAL EVIDENCE
Lavird v. Seissell" was a suit brought to contest the will of
Lee E. Havird. The suit was brought by a surviving sister of
the deceased and another woman of unknown relation. The will
was executed the day the testator entered the hospital and was
admitted to probate upon his death. At trial it was found that
the instrument was a will in accordance with the statutes of this
state. The lower court also found no undue influence in the
making of the will. The only question submitted to the jury was
the mental capacity of the deceased and he was found to have
10. 241 S.C. 225, 127 S.E.2d 722 (1962).
11. 166 S.E.2d 801 (S.C. 1969). Lee E. Havird was a bachelor, but he had
two illegitimate sons to whom he left his estate.
1969]
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had sufficient mental capacity to make a will. On appeal the
parties contesting the will contended that the issue of undue
influence should also have been submitted to the jury. Even
though undue influence may be proved by circumstantial evi-
dence in South Carolina, the circumstances must point unmis-
takably to the fact that the testator could not think for him-
self.12 The supreme court felt the circumstances 3 relied on in
Havird were not sufficient to raise an issue for the jury in this
instance, and affirmed the validity of the will.
III. COMPETENCY OF WrnExssES
In Havird v. o&kisell,14 supra, South Carolina fell in line
with the rule followed in jurisdictions having Deadman's
Statutes siniliar to ours.15 The appellants contended that the
testimony of the attorneys who were representing the estate of
the deceased should have been excluded since they were parties
whose interest would be affected by the results of the case. Most
of the attorneys' testimony was addressed to an issue not in-
volved on appeal. The remainder was addressed to the question
of the competency of the testator and certain other details con-
cerning the preparation and execution of the will.
Havird presented the court with a novel question: Is an at-
torney who draws a will and later is appointed by the executor
to defend the same will disqualified from testifying at the con-
test of the will because of the Deadman's Statute?. In approach-
ing this question the court relied in part on McLaucldin V.
Greacett,'0 which stated:
... a witness is disqualified only when there is a possi-
bility that his interest may be affected by "the direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment." 7
12. Smith v. Whetstone, 209 S.C. 78, 39 S.E.2d 127 (1946).
13. Appellants attempted to show that Mr. Havird was in poor mental
condition and thus was capable of being influenced by others. The evidence
as to his mental condition, was in conflict and capable of more than one rea-
sonable inference. Only one person testified that on the date the will was
made he was irrational. Appellants contended that John F. Tribble had in-
fluenced Mr. Havird in making the will, but respondent's evidence showed this
to be an unfounded contention. A doctor also testified that Tribble had con-
vinced Mr. Havird to enter the hospital, but there was no evidence that any
pressure had been exerted on Mr. Havird when he was making the will. The
court felt the testimony of the witnesses did not point to any conclusions and
was not substantiated by the facts.
14. 166 S.E.2d 801 (S.C. 1969).
15. South Carolina's statute is found at S.C. CODF ANN. § 26-402 (1962).
For the rule in other jurisdictions, see 58 Am. JuR. Wi~tesses § 312 (1948).
16. 224 S.C. 296, 79 S.E2d 149 (1953).
17. Id. at 318, 79 S.E2d at 159.
[Vol. 21
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The court also stated that it is well established in this sfate that
an executor is obligated to obtain an attorney to defend the will
of his testator and to pay the attorney's expenses out of the
estate without regard to the success of the action.' After con-
sidering these rules the court stated that the attorneys in this
instance had no interest which would be affected by the judg-
ment in the case. It was pointed out, however, that an agreement
for a contingent fee to be paid out of the judgment recovered
might give an attorney an interest which would disqualify him.
Although the court found no error in the trial and did not
want to be unduly critical of counsel, it strongly advised strict
adherence to the 19th Canon of Professional Ethics, Supreme
Court Rule 32, which states:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to
merely formal matters, such as the attestation or cus-
tody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the
trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential
to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying
in Court in behalf of his client.
Strict adherence to this rule would probably prevent a question
similar to this from being raised again in the future.
The appellants also contended that the admission of testimony
by the executor and a son of the deceased violated the Dead-
man's Statute.-9 In holding the testimony admissible, the court
cited the following authority:
The majority doctrine is that notwithstanding the testi-
mony of an interested witness may generally fall within
the inhibition of the statute as to evidence of transac-
tions or communications with a decedent, he may testify
to the acts, demeanor, or conduct of the decedent where
the testimony is offered merely for its bearing on an
issue of mental competency.
20
IV. DAMAGES
In Diamond Swimming Pool Co. v. Broone 21 the plaintiff
sued for part of the cost of a swimming pool and patio which he
18. Ex parte Miller, 192 S.C. 164, 5 S.E2d 865 (1939).
19. S.C. CoDE Axn. § 26-402 (1962).
20. 166 S.E2d at 806, citing Arnot., 146 A.L.R. 250, 268 (1943).
21. 166 S.E2d 308 (S.C. 1969).
19691
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had built for the defendant. 22 The master awarded the defen-
dant a setoff of $1275 against the plaintiff's claim because of
defects in the work. On appeal the defendant claimed that the
master had not given the proper amount in setoff. The only
evidence introduced concerning the cost of repairing the defect
was submitted by a single witness for the defendant. The
defendant contended that the master should have followed the
general rule which the court stated to be:
. . . the testimony of an unimpeached disinterested
witness which concerns facts within the witness' knowl-
edge and competence and is neither improbable nor
contradicted in any way by any other evidence in the
case, must be taken as true.
23
If the court had followed this rule the master would have had to
accept the witness' estimate of the cost of repairing the defect
($3385) and used it as the setoff amount. But the court in this
instance found a way around the general rule:
There may be, however, inherent contradiction or im-
probability in the witness' statements which take the
case out of the general rule and justify the fact finder
in giving the testimony less than full value. Similarly,
the witness' manner of testifying or omissions in his
statement may give rise to reasonable doubts of his
sincerity or knowledge.
24
The court felt in this instance the fact finder was correct in not
accepting the estimate of the only witness. The estimate was
one-half the total cost of the pool and even though the witness
stated he had computed the cost of repair, he was unable in a
reasonable length of time to give a break-down of his estimate.
Since the witness had not sufficiently substantiated his figure
the court felt the master was correct in not accepting it.
Justice Brailsford in his dissent 25 agreed that the master was
not bound to accept the estimate of defendant's witness, but
argued that the master was not authorized to use another figure
22. The parties had entered into a written agreement in consideration of
$3,000 cash and a balance of $4,975 to be due upon completion of the patio and
pool. (The agreement was alleged to have been orally modified later on.)
On completion of the job $3475 remained unpaid.
23. 166 S.E.2d at 311.
24. Id. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1191, 1207-10 (1958) (cited by the court).
25. 166 S.E.2d 308, 312 (dissenting opinion). Justice Bussey concurred in
Justice Brailsford's dissent.
[Vol. 21
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as a setoff which had no support in the evidence. According to
the dissenters' argument there was not sufficient evidence to
decide the case either way. Accordingly, it should have been
remanded for a new trial.
V. RELEVANCY
A. Generally
In appealing an abortion conviction, the defendant in State
v. Hutto2 6 alleged that the trial court had erred in admitting a
bank loan payment book into evidence. The book had been
admitted in spite of the defendant's contention that it was
irrelevant. Since the book did not show the purpose of the loan
or its relation to the facts in question, the defendant argued
that the lower court had erred in its ruling. According to the
decision in Francais v. Mauldin,27 all that is required of evi-
dence for it to be relevant "is that the fact shown legally tends
to establish, or to make more or less probable, some matter in
issue and to bear directly or indirectly thereon."28 The loan
book admitted in Hutto allegedly represented a loan, obtained
by the individual by whom the prosecutrix became pregnant, to
pay for her abortion. If the loan book had been admitted into
evidence without further explanation the supreme court might
well have held it to be inadmissible. The loan book, however,
was transformed into relevant evidence by later testimony con-
cerning the loan and its purpose to which the defendant did not
object. The court felt the defendant could not have been preju-
diced by the admission of the book since the testimony was later
offered without objection. Thus the decision of the lower court
was affirmed on the basis of the general rule that the admission
of evidence is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial
judge and his ruling will not be overturned unless there is an
abuse of this discretion.
Although the supreme court felt that the lower court should
have allowed one of the plaintiff's witnesses to testify concern-
ing certain water drippings around the body of the deceased,
the court in Smith v. Winningha"29 affirmed the decision of
the lower court. The court found no error in the exclusion since
testimony to the same effect was later admitted. This decision
26. 165 S.E.2d 72 (S.C. 1968).
27. 215 S.C. 374, 55 S.E2d 337 (1949).
28. Id. at 378, 55 S.E.2d at 338.
29. 166 S.E.2d 825 (S.C. 1969).
1969]
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is in accord with the well established rule in this state that
"[a]lleged error in the exclusion of offered testimony is of no
avail if the same testimony or testimony to the same effect had
been or was afterwards allowed to be given by the witness."30
B. Demonstrative Evidence
Appealing a conviction for murder, the defendant in State v.
Novi 831 alleged error in the trial judge's admission of certain
pictures into evidence. The pictures showed injuries sustained by
a witness to the crime and the condition of the witness' clothing
at the time of the murder. The defendant contended the judge
erred in admitting these photographs because the witness had
stated that all her injuries were not caused by the defendant.
The witness did, however, point out which injuries were caused
by the defendant. The supreme court, following the accepted
rule in South Carolina, stated that the trial judge has within
his discretion the power to determine the relevancy and material-
ity of a photograph.32 The court found no abuse of this dis-
cretion in Norris and therefore affirmed the defendant's murder
conviction.
33
Even though the lower court in Jones v. Dague"4 had allowed
the jury to have with them during deliberation a high school
yearbook which contained material that had been ruled inad-
missible, the supreme court rejected a contention by the defen-
dants that they were entitled to a new trial because of this
alleged prejudical error. The lower court had allowed pictures
of the deceased to be entered into evidence, but excluded portions
of the yearbook which contained a memorial to her. When the
30. 166 S.E.2d at 827. As authority for this rule the court cited: Nelson
v. Coleman Co., 249 S.C. 652, 155 S.E2d 917 (1967); La Count v. General
Asbestos & Rubber Co., 184 S.C. 232, 192 S.E. 262 (1937); and five earlier
cases.
31. 168 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 1969).
32. Id. at 568. The court cited State v. Thorne, 239 S.C. 164, 121 S.E.2d
623 (1961); State v. Jones, 228 S.C. 484, 91 S.E2d 1 (1956); State v.
Edwards, 194 S.C. 410, 10 S.E.2d 587 (1939).
33. After the admission of the photographs into evidence and their pub-
lication to the jury, the defendant's counsel objected to them on the grounds
that they would tend to inflame the jury. Although the court said it found
nothing inflamatory in the pictures, this objection was not considered in detail
because it was not asserted until after the pictures were offered as evidence
and published to the jury. Objections of this nature should be interposed when
the photographs are offered as evidence.
34. 166 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1969). This was an action brought by the plain-
tiffs for the alleged wrongful death of their daughter. The lower court
rendered judgment for the parents in the sum of $25,000. When the defen-
dant's motions for judgment non obstante veredicto and in the alternative for
a new trial were denied, he appealed to the supreme court.
[Vol. 21
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yearbook was submitted to the jury the inadmissible portions
were held back by rubber bands and the trial judge reminded
the jury that they could not consider these portions of the book.
Defendant felt these instructions caused the jury to speculate
that something harmful to the defendant was in the excluded
portion of the book. It was also suggested that the jury might
have examined these portions of the yearbook, but there was no
proof to this effect. The supreme court rejected the defendant's
contentions and followed the general rule which leaves the deter-
mination of the relevancy and admissibility of a photograph
within the discretion of the trial judge.35 Since it felt this
discretion had not been abused, the court affirmed the lower
court's decision.
Although the court gave no actual indication that in the
future it would hold evidence prejudical which was admitted in
a manner similar to that in Jones, it did suggest what it felt to
be a better procedure. The court suggested that the judge in
these instances should so remove and isolate the excluded portion
as to eliminate all possibility of jury inspection of the inadmis-
sible evidence.
C. Liabiliy Insurance Coverage
[T]here was once a vague theory that an insured person
was more likely to be careless than an uninsured one
and therefore the existence of insurance was relevant on
the issue of negligence. This idea was, of course, dis-
carded long ago, and the only problem now is whether
the incidental mentioning of insurance in the court
room is so prejudical to the insured side that a mistrial
should be ordered.
3 6
The court in Jones v. MassingaZe 3 7 said that the possible preju-
dice which might result from the jury's knowledge of the insur-
ance coverage must be weighed against the burden on the court
and the plaintiff from a multiplicity of suits. Jones seems to
follow the decision in VoZlington v. Southern Paving Construction
Co.38 which stated that the court has the power, but is not com-
pelled, to set aside a verdict because of the mention of insurance
coverage.
35. See Reid v. Swindler, 249 S.C. 483, 154 S.E.2d 910 (1967); Peagler v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 234 S.C. 140, 107 S.E2d 15 (1959).
36. J. DREHER, A GUIDE To EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA 40 (1967).
37. 251 S.C. 456, 163 S.E.2d 217 (1968).
38. 166 S.C. 448, 165 S.E. 184 (1932).
1969]
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In Jones the defendant alleged that a release had been signed
and executed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff replied that the
release was obtained by fraud. A separate trial on the issue of
the validity of the release was requested by the defendant be-
cause of alleged prejudice that would result from the jury's
learning of the defendant's insurance coverage. The lower court
refused the defendant's motion and the supreme court affirmed
this ruling since the trial judge had shown no abuse of his
discretion. The court in Jones appears to have taken a realistic
approach to the problem of the jury's being made aware of
insurance coverage in an automobile accident case when it stated:
[A] jury in an automobile collision case today, in view
of our financial responsibility law, can perhaps hardly
be expected to doubt seriously the existence of liability
insurance coverage.
Today owners of motor vehicles are almost required
by law to procure liability insurance, and there is a
popular belief (though an erroneous one) that liability
insurance in this state is actually required. Before a
person (including, of course, jurors) may procure an
annual license plate for his motor vehicle he must prove
his liability coverage or contribute to the uninsured
motorist fund. Accordingly, every juror who owns an
automobile is of necessity well aware of the likelihood
of liability insurance coverage. When evidence is ad-
missible on one issue but should not be considered as to
another issue in the trial of the same case, such need
not be excluded.39
Jones may be an expansion of the Vollington ruling since it
deals with a motion made before the trial. Yollington and the
cases before40 and after4' dealt with situations in which counsel
or a witness accidently or intentionally mentioned insurance
coverage. While these cases involve overt reference to insurance,
in the present case the mention of the validity of a release would
inform the jury of the presence of insurance only by implication.
Another possible qualifying factor in Jones is that the insurance
company was not a party to this action. Whether this would
39. 251 S.C. 456, 463, 163 S.E.2d 217, 220 (1968).
40. Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92 S.C. 236, 75 S.E. 533 (1912).
41. Crocker v. Weathers, 240 S.C. 412 126 S E 2d 335 (1962) ; Powell v.
Drake, 199 S.C. 212, 18 S.E.2d 745 (19425; Haynes v. Graham, 192 S.C. 382,
6 S.E.2d 903 (1940).
[Vol. 21
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have any bearing on the outcome of the case the court did not
say.
D. Character
Although in a criminal prosecution evidence of the commis-
sion of another, independent crime is generally inadmissible,
42
State v. Danies 43 was an exception to the rule. In Daniels the
defendant and another were convicted of burgulary after the
admission of testimony given by a woman whose diner had been
robbed on the same night as the burgulary by men answering the
description of the co-defendants. The appellant contended that
the woman's testimony allowed the jury to infer that she was
robbed by the appellant. The court felt the jury was not left
with this inference, but even if the opposite were conceded, this
would not amount to reversible error. In affirming the decision
of the lower court, the supreme court cited an exception to the
general rule against admissibility, and stated that evidence of
another crime is competent to prove the specific crime charged
when it tends to establish identity.
44
According to Professor Dreher, "[wihat is important is that
the proof of other crimes must come in to prove directly some
issue of substance in the present case and not just to show that
the accused is a bad man and probably guilty.45 Daniels fits the
exception described above since the purpose of the testimony was
to establish the whereabouts of the defendants at a certain time
on the night of the burgulary. This testimony thus had direct
bearing on an issue of substance in the case.
VI. WMTNGS
A. Parol Evidence Rule
In Draffin v. Chrysler Motors Cop.46 the lower court per-
mitted the plaintiff's son to testify in apparent violation of the
42. State v. Thomas, 248 S.C. 573, 151 S.E.2d 855 (1966).
43. 167 S.E.2d 621 (S.C. 1969).
44. In State v. Thomas, 248 S.C. 573, 151 S.E.2d 855 (1966), the court
stated that there were various exceptions to the general rule and set them out:
Generally speaking, evidence of another crime is competent to prove
the specific crime charged when it tends to establish, (1) motive;
(2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common
scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes
so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the
others; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commis-
sion of the crime on trial.
Id. at 582-83, 151 S.E.2d 855.
45. J. DREHnR, A GUIDE TO EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA 36 (1967).
46. 166 S.E2d 305 (S.C. 1969).
1969]
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parol evidence rule, but the supreme court set aside the verdict
without considering this issue because the verdict was excessive.
In dicta, however, the court reiterated the existing South Caro-
lina rule that a written warranty cannot be enlarged by oral
testimony if the warranty is unambiguous and is not lost or
unavailable at the time of the trial.47 The court also said that in
the absence of testimony showing that an employee had the
power to vary the manufacturer's written warranty, the manu-
facturer is bound only by the terms of the written agreement.48
B. Best Evidence Rule
In Riddle v. City of Greenvil1e49 the owner of a dairy farm
which adjoined a stream brought suit to recover for damages
sustained because of pollution of the stream.50 The lower court
rendered a verdict in the plaintiff's favor for $22,500. On appeal
the defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to prove damages
in the present suit different from those recovered in a prior
action. The supreme court agreed with the defendant's conten-
tion and reversed the judgment of the lower court.
During the course of the trial in the present action, the plain-
tiff on direct examination testified that in the first suit, which
was against Ling-Temco-Vaught Electrosystems, Inc. (herein-
after LTV), his verdict was based on damages done to his cattle
and dairy operation. The defendant's counsel objected to this
statement by the plaintiff as follows:
Mr. Arnold: Your Honor, we don't agree with that and
we think that the record would be the best evidence as
to what it related to. We don't mind him testifying to
it at the proper time. We want to put in the record
in that LTV case.
The Court: All right. You may proceed Mr. Clay.51
47. Id. at 307, citing Profit v. Sitton, 244 S.C. 206, 136 S.E.2d 257 (1964);
Charleston & Western Ry. v. Joyce, 231 S.C. 493, 99 S.E.2d 187 (1957).
48. 166 S.E.2d at 307, citing Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95
S.E.2d 601 (1956).
49. 251 S.C. 473, 163 S.E.2d 462 (1968).
50. The defendant city had sold or leased land to various industries. The
city also operated a sewage disposal plant in the area, the discharge from
which went into a stream known as Huff Creek. Plaintiff owned a dairy
farm near the defendant's land and sought to recover damages caused by the
discharge of certain elements into the creek. The gist of the complaint was
that the damage to his property caused by the discharge was tantamount to a
taking without just compensation.
51. 163 S.E.2d at 463.
[Vol. 21
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The "Best Evidence Rule" has been stated: "In proving the terms
of a; writing, where such terms are material, the original writing
must be produced, unless it is shown to be unavailable for some
reason other than the serious fault of the proponent."5 2 In
light of this rule, the objection apparently should have been
sustained. If the terms of the writing are not in issue the rule
does not apply,53 but in _iddle the terms of the writing were in
issue. The trial judge evidently did sustain the defendant's
objection in accordance with the general rule, but his language
is not clear. The LTV record was never introduced into evidence
and the plaintiff did not try to show how his damages differed
in the two actions.
The plaintiff later admitted under cross examination that he
had testified in LTV that his land had been damaged by pollu-
tion. This admission was in conflict with his testimony that his
damages in LTV were due to injuries to his cattle and dairy
business. The supreme court felt the plaintiff had not given the
jury any information from which they could determine if there
were different damages involved in the two suits. Thus the court
reversed and remanded the case because of an insufficiency of
evidence.
VII. Du PRocEss IN TnE LAw OF EVIDENCE
In State 'v. Richardson54 the defendant was sentenced to seven
years for the slaying of his son. On appeal he contended that
he was denied the right to confront and cross-examine a witness
against him in violation of his sixth amendment right to con-
frontation. The witness in question was the daughter of the
defendant. Her name had been included on the back of the
indictment as a possible witness, but she was not called at the
trial. Defendant contended that since she was the cause of the
family trouble which led to the shooting, he should have the
right to cross-examine her.
In order to decide whether the defendant's rights had been
violated, the court had to decide whether the prosecution was
required to call the girl. In affirming the lower court's ruling,
the court said:
52. J. DREHER, A GuiDE TO EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA 49 (1967),
quoting C. McCoimicK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 196 (1954).
53. Sims v. Jones, 43 S.C. 91, 20 S.E. 905 (1895).
54. Smith's Advance Sheet #22 (June 14, 1969).
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While a. different rule apparently prevailed at early
common law, it is now the general rule that the State is
not required to place upon the stand every witness who
has knowledge of material facts connected with the
crime charged or whose name is endorsed upon the in-
dictment. The prosecution is required to prove the guilt
of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt and may,
in its discretion, determine what witnesses will be called
in presenting such proof.",
Since in the present case the State did not prevent the witness
from attending the trial or rely on any statement of the witness
to prove its case against the defendant, the court found the
defendant had suffered no legal prejudice.
At the trial the judge had instructed the jury that an adverse
inference might be drawn because of the defendant's failure to
call a witness available to him. The defendant contended the
judge should not have so instructed the jury. The court, how-
ever, did not consider this question because the objection was
not timely.
ROBERT E. STAToN
55. Id. at 9. The court cited: 58 Am. JUR. Wihiesses § 3 (1948); 23
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1017 et seq. (1961); 7 J. WiGMom, EvIDENCE § 2079
(1940).
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